The Russian Federation view the Crimea Peninsula as a vital strategic asset. In particular the port of Sevastopol, which is home to the Black Sea Fleet.

Because of its strategic position, it has been fought over many times and holds a special place in the history of Russia. Although I will only go into more detail about the post-Soviet era, here are a few important events:

• Before being annexed by Russia in 1783 it was part of the Crimean–Nogai slave trade, with many of the slaves being captured in Russia for ‘marketing’ in Western Europe and the Middle East.
• Major battles took place during the Crimea War (October 1853 to February 1856), with Sevastopol being under siege for nearly a year.
• After the end of World War I, tens of thousands of allied troops were redeployed to fight against the Soviet Union in Russian¹ with major battles taking place in and around Crimea.
• During World War II, it was the scene of some of the bloodiest battles on the Eastern Front during World War II. Sevastopol was under siege for over 250 days before falling to the allied powers.

Post Soviet History

During the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Ukraine becoming an independent state that status of Crimea was very uncertain and at one point a “Republic of Crimea”² was declared. This was short-lived, and Crimea became an autonomous region inside Ukraine in 1992 however, there continued to be a lot of protests and discussion about the future of Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet³.

In 1995 the Ukrainian parliament abolished the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Ukrainian national guard removed the President of the region⁴ who was arrested and deported to Russia. Eventually, the Russians and Ukrainians reached a compromise over the base at Sevastopol in 1997 and the base was leased from Ukraine for 20 years. In 2010 the lease was extended for another 25 years⁵.

One of the big issues with the Crimean people was that many of them have strong family and economic ties with the Black Sea Fleet. If they were Ukrainian citizens residents, they would not be allowed to work at Russian Black Sea Fleet facilities, and children of Russian seamen would not be allowed to enter Russian naval academies or serve in the Russian Armed Forces. In June 1993 the Crimean parliament passes a decree appealing to both the Ukrainian and Russian presidents to maintain the fleet jointly with Sevastopol as the home port.

Unlike other regions where the claim that people voted to join the Russian Federation can be disputed there is little doubt that the majority of people in Crimea wanted to be part of the Russian Federation.

Links Between Russia And Black Sea Fleet

When the Russian Federation annexed Crimea in 2014 there were no Russian-controlled land routes to the peninsula. However, this was not a great problem since they could easily supply their military in the region by sea or air. They have little problem supplying their naval base at Tartus in Syria and the USA has little problem supplying their numerous naval bases around the world.

Proposals to build a bridge between the North Caucasus region of Russia and Crimea had been discussed for many years. Initially this was to be a joint project between Russia and Ukraine⁶ but construction was taken over by Russia after the deteriorating relationship between the two stated in 2013. Construction on the bridge was started in February 2016 and was opened in May 2018 despite European Union sanctions against the companies involved⁷. The bridge is 19 km long and is the longest bridge in Europe.

Although a bridge was not essential for Russia’s links to Crimea, particularly from a military aspect since it would be susceptible to attacks, the Russian Federation did want a secure land route to Crimea. President Putin has stated:⁸

“…in general I do not rule out preservation of the Ukrainian sovereignty over these territories, provided Russia has a stable land bridge to Crimea.

It means that Kiev should guarantee servitude, as they call it, a legally formalised right of access for Russia to the Crimean Peninsula via Kherson and Zaporozhye regions. This is a critical political decision. “And, of course, in its final version, it would not be adopted unilaterally but only after consultations with the Security Council, with other institutions, of course, after discussion with citizens, the public of our country and, above all, with residents of the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions.”

Strategic Target For Ukraine Or For Nato?

Crimea has been one of the main focuses of Ukrainian attacks in the current conflict. Despite claims in the Western press about Russia possibly losing control over Crimea^9,10 there seems to be little evidence to support this.

One of the reasons that the situation in Crimea is so dangerous is that it has long term strategic implications. If Crimea and the Black Sea port are lost, then this would weaken the Russian Federation considerably compared to NATO in any future conflict. However, it can be argued that it could also be key to Ukraine’s fight in the south^11,12 of Ukraine.

However, since the Russian Federation now has a reasonably secure land bridge, not just to Crimea but to the whole of the front, it is doubtful if they are using Crimea as a ‘strategic hub’ in its war with Ukraine.

Although some of the hypersonic missiles Russia uses to target Ukraine are launched from ships (they were initially designed to destroy aircraft carriers) the ships have now been repositioned by Russia away from Ukrainian attacks in Crimea.

One of the main focuses of Ukraine’s offensive in 2023 was to take back Crimea¹³, however they only reached the first Russian defensive line just past the village of Robotyne¹⁴. The offensive advanced about 20km of the 370km needed to reach Sevastopol. This area has now been retaken by the Russian Federation.

With serious losses in other regions, very substantial Russian defence lines and little strategic value in the war with Ukraine, it can be questioned if the attempted offensive towards Crimea was to the benefit of Ukraine or NATO. A similar question can be asked about the recent attacks on Russia’s nuclear early warning systems^15,16.

How Far Would Russia Go To Defend Crimea?

As Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov¹⁷ stated in 2014:

“I would not advise anyone to do this. We have the doctrine of national security, and it very clearly regulates the actions, which will be taken in this case,”

This was taken by many in the West as a threat to use nuclear weapons¹⁸. If they are really taking this ‘threat’ seriously, are they trying to provoke a nuclear response from Russia?

It is worthwhile pointing out that the actual ‘doctrine of national security’ merely states that they will inflict “damage, subjectively unacceptable to the enemy, which exceeds the benefits the aggressor expects to gain as a result of the use of military force”¹⁹. Whether the response would involve nuclear weapons would depend on other factors. They could respond with a non-nuclear “shock and awe” attack.

Understanding Crimea Is Essential For Peace

Appreciating the historic and strategic importance of Crimea to Russia is essential before a sustainable peace can be negotiated.

More importantly, there is a very fuzzy line between what is being done in Ukraine’s interest and what is advantageous to NATO. With such unclear line the conflict could escalate into direct confrontation between NATO and the Russian Federation.

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1. Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War; Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied_intervention_in_the_Russian_Civil_War) ↩︎
2. Crimea Parliament Votes to Back Independence From Ukraine; New York Times; 6 May 1992 (https://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/06/world/crimea-parliament-votes-to-back-independence-from-ukraine.html) ↩︎
3. Chronology for Crimean Russians in Ukraine; Refworld, UNHCR (https://webarchive.archive.unhcr.org/20230521204858/https://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38ec2.html) ↩︎
4. Striking At Separatists Ukraine Abolishes Crimea’s Charter Presidency; New York Times; 17 March 1995 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/03/18/striking-at-separatists-ukraine-abolishes-crimeas-charter-presidency/1e153fe8-b5f8-40ea-9638-f0182bbb6471/) ↩︎
5. Ukraine Woos Russia With Lease Deal; New York Times; 21 April 2010 (https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/world/europe/22ukraine.html) ↩︎
6. Russia, Ukraine to construct bridge across Kerch Strait; Kyiv Post; 26 November 2010 (https://archive.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/russia-ukraine-to-construct-bridge-across-kerch-st-91405.html) ↩︎
7. Russia reacts angrily as EU adds 6 companies to sanctions list; Politico; 1 August 2018 (https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-europe-sanctions-reacts-angrily-adds-6-companies/) ↩︎
8. Meeting with Foreign Ministry senior officials; Kremlin; 14 June 2024 (http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/74285) ↩︎
9. Ukraine is making the Russian occupation of Crimea untenable; Atlantic Council; 12 June 2024 (https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-is-making-the-russian-occupation-of-crimea-untenable/) ↩︎
10. Putin may be about to lose Crimea; The Telegraph; 11 June 2024 (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/06/11/putin-russia-crimea-kerch-land-bridge-supply-route-logistic/) ↩︎
11. Ukraine ‘ready’ to talk to Russia on Crimea if counteroffensive succeeds; Financial Times; 5 April 2023 (https://www.ft.com/content/d68b4007-4ddf-4320-b29a-f2eee2662d6e) ↩︎
12. Ukraine’s Crimea attacks seen as key to counter-offensive against Russia; BBC; 16 September 2023 (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66829826) ↩︎
13. Ukraine is expected to make a counteroffensive to take back Crimea; NPR; 13 May 2023 (https://www.npr.org/2023/05/13/1176001736/ukraine-is-expected-to-make-a-counteroffensive-to-take-back-crimea) ↩︎
14. Mapping Ukraine’s counteroffensive; Reuters; 21 December 2023 (https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/MAPS/klvygwawavg/#four-factors-that-stalled-ukraines-counteroffensive) ↩︎
15. Strike On Russian Strategic Early Warning Radar Site Is A Big Deal; The War Zone; 24 May 2024 (https://www.twz.com/news-features/strike-on-russian-strategic-early-warning-radar-site-is-a-big-deal) ↩︎
16. Ukraine drone targets second Russian long-range military radar, Kyiv source says; Reuters; 27 May 2024 (https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-drone-targets-russian-early-warning-radar-record-distance-kyiv-source-2024-05-27/) ↩︎
17. No one should even try to attack Crimea – Russian FM Lavrov; Pravda; 9 July 2014 (https://english.pravda.ru/russia/128011-attack_crimea_lavrov/) ↩︎
18. Russia Threatens Nuclear Strikes Over Crimea; The Diplomat; 11 July 2014 (https://thediplomat.com/2014/07/russia-threatens-nuclear-strikes-over-crimea/) ↩︎
19. Russia Clarifies Its Nuclear Deterrence Policy; Dr. Nikolai Sokov, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation; 3 June 2020 (https://vcdnp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Ukaz-on-nuclear-deterrence_final.pdf) ↩︎